ABSTRACT Due to the development of intelligent electric devices and advanced metering infrastructures, demand response will be widely utilized in the trading of the electricity market and maintain energy balance of the power system. In this paper, a two-stage nested bilevel model for the optimal bidding strategy of a load agent (LA) with incentive-based demand response in day-ahead and balancing markets is proposed. In the upper-level model, the optimal trading strategy of the LA is formulated to maximize the operating profit of the LA in the day-ahead energy and balancing markets. On the other hand, the lower-level proposes the clearing market model of the independent system operator, which aim to maximize social welfare. The LA acts as a price-maker in the first-stage of the bilevel model, which is bilevel nonlinear programming (BNLP) problem. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and dual theory are used to transform the BNLP into single-level programming. The LA acts as a price-taker accepts the day-ahead energy clearing-price in the second-stage of the bilevel model, which is a bilevel mixed-integer linear stochastic programming problem. Finally, implementing the two-stage nested bilevel model on modifying the 8-bus power system demonstrates the applicability of the proposed model and analysis the sensitivity of the LA' profit to unit price and the committed reserve capacity demand of the day-ahead reserve market. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The improvement of demand-side management and the development of load management have played critical roles in maintaining the stability of a smart grid while promoting economic development [1] . DR [2] - [3] , as an interactive mechanism, establishes the link between the wholesale energy market operated by the ISO and the retail market operated by the LA [4] - [8] . The LA acts as an intermediary trading medium between the customers and the electricity market [9] . It is able to not only apply DR resources to bid in the DAEM [10] but also apply DR resources to maintain energy balance in the BAM [11] . However, an issue to be addressed is how to make a model that enables the LA to participate as a price-maker in the bidding and pricing in the DAEM and as a price-taker that can accept DEP and IDP in the BAM. Hence, the LA will create multiple revenue streams.
DR attempt to incentivize electricity customers to change their electricity consumption behavior [12] . These DR have played an important role in peak shaving, reducing prices and improving the reliability of the grid [13] . DR are divided into two categories: price-based demand response (PBDR) and IBDR. The response time, response characteristics and response capability are elaborated in [9] . In PBDR, consumers change their electricity consumption behavior according to the trend of electricity price. In IBDR, a fixed or time-varying incentive payment is offered to consumers to change their behavior. In [14] , IBDR and PBDR are presented and implemented on several real energy markets, such as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO), and PJM Interconnection. Demand responses are modeled based on price elasticity to reduce cost, improve reliability and increase customer acceptance, according to [15] . In this paper, we use the LA to manage the demand response and to participate in the DAEM and BAM. There are many operating entities similar to a LA, such as a demand response aggregator [28] a load serving entity (LSE) [24] and a distribution company [25] . They have become active intermediate agents connecting wholesale energy markets and customers. The main decision-making issue for these intermediate agents is developing an optimal bidding strategy in the electricity market. At present, there are many studies on the optimal bidding strategy of intermediate agents in wholesale energy markets. These studies can be divided into two categories: 1 intermediate agent as price-taker, and 2 intermediate agent as price-maker.
When the intermediate agent is the price-taker, it formulates its bidding strategy and scheduling plan according to the electricity price scenarios of the wholesale energy market. In [16] , three additional markets are designed that include the options market, the spot market and the flexibility market, and an optimal bidding strategy for a flexibility VOLUME 7, 2019 aggregator participating in three sequential markets is developed. A bottom-up model for demand response aggregators in electricity markets is studied in [17] , and the demand response aggregator is considered to be a price-taker. The LS, LC and LR of the demand response options are modeled using a stochastic programming approach at the bottom level. In the upper level, the trading strategy of DR in the day-ahead market and balancing market, considering uncertain prices. In [18] , the price-based scheduling of a generation company with ten thermal units and a demand response aggregation company with commercial, industrial, residential and agricultural loads are studied. A bidding strategy and compensation mechanisms for a LA in day-ahead and real-time markets are studied in [19] . In [20] , stochastic decision making for a bidding strategy of WPP in the day-ahead and balancing markets is proposed. Due to the uncertainty of the market price, the offer price of the WPP and the demand of DR, conditional on value risk, are considered in the decision making. In [21] , two optimization approaches are proposed for the optimal demand bidding strategy of the LA. The first optimization is a two-stage stochastic programming problem for the optimal supplying and bidding of the LA in day-ahead and realtime markets. The second optimization is a model using a predictive control method to control the operation of flexible loads in real time. In [22] , a robust optimization approach for optimal bidding and offering strategies for electricity retailers is proposed. This paper uses confidence intervals to simulate the uncertainty of energy prices.
When the intermediate agent is considered as a pricemaker, the bidding strategy of the intermediate agent and the pricing strategy of the wholesale energy markets will be decided simultaneously. A bilevel framework has been applied in several studies. In [23] , a bidding and offering strategy for a flexible LA in day-ahead energy and reserve markets is presented. The aim of the upper level is to maximize the revenue of the flexible LA in day-ahead energy and reserve markets, considering the operational constraints of multiple flexible loads. Lower levels maximize the social welfare of the day-ahead market. In [24] , a tri-layer market trading structure is proposed that consists of the wholesale energy market, the retail electricity market and the end-users. Based on the structure, a bilevel model for the joint bidding and pricing of LSE is formulated. In [25] , a distribution company is considered be a price maker in wholesale energy and reserve markets. The operation strategy of the distribution company and ISO are formulated as a bilevel optimization problem. In [26] , to model the trading punitive effect of the balancing market, the WPP is not capable of exactly predicting power production. A bilevel model is proposed, in which the WPP earns the maximum income in day-ahead and balancing markets in the upper level and the lower-level problem is to clear the day-ahead market. A particle swarm optimization algorithm is applied to solve this model. In [27] , an active distribution network based on a technical virtual power plant (TVPP) is considered an intermediate agent. The upper-level problem is to maximize the profit of the TVPP.
However, the market is cleared at a lower level. In addition, a bilevel framework is applied to the intermediate agent and customers in [29] . The operational scheduling of a distribution company with an electric vehicle parking lot and a renewable energy source is studied. At the upper level, the distribution company minimizes the cost of energy purchased from the wholesale energy market. The parking lot aims to maximize the profit of the customers at the lower level.
In this paper, we manage DR options through the LA, considering that the IBDR includes LC, LS, LR and DB. Based on the trading and interaction framework of the wholesale energy market, the retailer electricity market and electricity customers. A two-stage nested bilevel model for the LA is proposed, which considers DB in DAEM and applies to LC, LS and LR in BAM. DB will change electricity consumption behaviors of LA while affecting the clearing-DEP in DAEM. LC, LS and LR will maintain the energy balance in the BAM. The first stage of the bilevel model is BNLP, and the LA acts as a price-maker. The second stage of the bilevel model is bilevel stochastic MILP, and the LA acts as a price-taker. Moreover, the BNLP is linearized through KKT conditions and dual theory. The uncertainty of the WPP is considered through generating scenarios in the second stage of the lower level. The main novel contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) A two-stage nested bilevel optimization model for LA participating in DAEM and BAM is presented. In the first-stage of bilevel model, the LA pursues maximum operating income in the upper-level model and the ISO seeks to simultaneously maximize the social benefits in the lower-level model.
2) The second-stage of upper-and lower-levels are composed of a bilevel stochastic MILP problem, solving the scheduling decision of Gencos and response quantity of LS, LC and LR in the BAM. This method is used to address the uncertainty of multiple scenarios in BAM, which includes IBDR trading in the upper level and WPP production in the lower-level.
3) We transform the BNLP to a single-level linear programming, which occurs through KKT conditions and dual theory. As a result, the joint bidding of the pricing problem can be solved through commercial solvers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the bilevel optimization framework is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the mathematical formulations of the bilevel model. The solving approach is described in Section 4.
The numerical results and analysis are elaborated in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION A. MARKET FRAMEWORK
The interactive framework is based on a hierarchical structure, which comprises three entities: power providers, customer agents and electricity customers, as shown in Fig. 1 . In this paper, the ISO is the operator of the wholesale energy market, which manages Gencos and the WPP. The ISO sells energy in the wholesale energy market and provides reserve capacity in the reserve market. The LA is the operator of the retailer electricity market, who purchases energy from the wholesale energy market and sells energy to electricity customers. The LA is an intermediary connecting the wholesale energy market and electricity customers, ensuring the exchange of energy and information. The interaction process of the ISO, LA and electricity customers is modeled as a hierarchical optimization procedure, which is formulated as a two-stage nested bilevel model. According to the time scale of the clearing market, the wholesale energy markets are divided into DAM and BAM. The DAM includes the DAEM and DARM, which are determined before uncertainty is observed. They can be regarded as here-and-now decisions. On the other hand, the wait-and-see decision would might be feasible after the uncertainty parameters are revealed in the BAM. In the upper-level model, the LA seeks to maximize profits in the DAEM and BAM. The LA's profit comes from three parts: 1. In the DAEM, the LA engages in price arbitrage by decreasing the purchase energy at high DEP and increasing the purchase energy at low DEP. 2. In the BAM, the LA receives reward by IBDR. 3. The LA charges the customers' electricity bill. In the lower-level model, Gencos, WPP and LA jointly participate in the wholesale energy market, which aims to maximize social welfare. The first stage of the upper/lower level is decided in the DAM, and the LA is considered a price-maker. Through the offering of Gencos and bidding of LA in the DAEM, the DEP and the scheduling results are determined. In addition, Gencos provides reserve capacity in the DARM. The second stage of the upper/lower level is decided in the BAM, and the LA is a price-taker. It is important to prevent energy imbalance caused by uncertain output from the WPP. According to the decision result of DEP in the first stage of the bilevel model, the LA manages DR based on the reward curve of the IBDR in the BAM, and the ISO dispatches the reserve capacity from Gencos based on the energy price they offered.
B. LA DESCRIPTION
The composition of the LA is shown in Figure 2 . The LA manages the electricity customers who sign agency contracts in a region; they can be divided into inelastic load without scheduling potential and flexible load with the characteristics of shifting, curtailment and recovery. The LA and flexible load customers sign contracts for DR, such as the IBDR, ensuring that flexible load can participate in wholesale energy market transactions to obtain benefits. In this paper, we design IBDR that include DB, LC, LR and LS [30] . The DB are uniformly managed by the LA to pursue maximum bidding income in the DAEM. Then, the customers of the DB change their electricity behavior based on the results of the bidding strategy. In the BAM, the LA controls the electricity customers who sign contacts for the LC, LR and LS, obtaining the reward for maintaining energy balance in the BAM. The contracts of the IBDR need to determine the type of demand response (DB, LC, LR and LS), the time of demand response, the maximum and minimum quantity of demand response and the reward price of demand response. The reward price of the IBDR given from the ISO to the LA and the reward price of the IBDR given from the LA to the customers are nonlinear in the BAM. The price of each step is constant, and the response quantity is a decision variable that appears in a range for each step. The reward curve of the IBDR in the BAM is shown in Figure 3 . Therefore, the higher the incentive the LA offers, the higher the response quantities that will be provided by the flexible load customers [31] .
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION A. UPPER-LEVEL MODEL
The upper-level model seeks to maximize the total profit of an LA trading in the DAEM and BAM through a two-stage stochastic programming; the objective function is defined as
where C DAEM LA is the total expected revenue of LA, which is the income obtained by the LA from selling energy to customers minus the cost of purchasing energy from the ISO. C BAM IBDR↓ is the incentive profit from the LC and the downward-LS in the BAM, which consists of demand response rewards paid by the ISO to the LA, the response rewards paid by the LA to the customers, and a refund due to the decreasing energy purchased by the LA from the BAM. C BAM IBDR↑ is the incentive profit from the LR and the upward-LS in the BAM, which includes the IBDR rewards paid by the ISO to the LA, the response rewards paid by the LA to the customer, and the income obtained from increased energy purchased by the LA from the ISO. Therefore, the objective function is formulated in (2 
The constraints of the upper-level model are shown in (2)-(13). The energy balance logical constraints equation of the DB is shown in (3). Equations (4), and (5) represents the constraints that define the bidding of DB in the DAEM. The load decrease and load increase of the IBDR energy balance are given in (6) and (7), respectively. The minimum and maximum quantity of the LC and LR that have been committed are formulated in (8) and (9), respectively. The LS also has a regulation limit for the upward quantity and downward quantity, which are given in (10) and (11) 
B. LOWER-LEVEL MODEL
The objective function of the lower-level model is that the ISO seeks to maximize social benefits, which is defined as
where C DAEM LAtoISO represents the total fees of purchasing energy paid by the LA to the ISO in the DAEM. C BAM ISOtoLA is the rewards of IBDR paid by the ISO to the LA in the BAM. C BAM LAtoISO is the income from the exchange energy paid by the LA to the ISO in the BAM. C DAEM ISOtoGenco represents the total fees of purchasing energy and the committed reserves paid by the ISO to Gencos in the DAEM and DARM. C BAM ISOtoGenco represents the fees of purchasing energy paid by the ISO to Gencos in the BAM. C BAM wppSpill is the penalty of wind power spill. The objective function of the lower-level model is formulated in (15) 
The constraints of the lower-level first stage are described in (17)- (22) . The energy balance constraints of the DAEM are shown in (16) . The operation constraints of Gencos are given in (17) and (18) . Equations (19) and (20) represent the minimum and maximum reserve committed constraints of Gencos, respectively. The energy scheduled constraints of the DB in the DAEM are formulated in (21) and (22) . The dual variables of the DAEM's equality and inequality constraints are written after the colon. The constraints of the lower-level second stage are described in (23)- (26) . The energy balance constraints of the BAM are shown in (23) . The limitation of Gencos production in the BAM under each scenario is formulated in (24) and (25) . The operation constraint of the WPP is shown in (26) . [32] and is formulated by equation (27) .
Subject to: (3)- (5), (16)- (20), (A.2)-(A16)
The second-stage upper-level model and the second-stage lower-level model are composed of a bilevel stochastic MILP model, solving the scheduling decision of Gencos and the response quantity of the LC, LR and LS in the BAM. The uncertainty of the WPP is addressed by representative scenarios [33] , which can be determined according to historical information on WPP generation. The objective function of the bilevel stochastic MILP model is given in equations (28) and (29), which can be solved using the solvebilevel function of Yalmip with a mathematical solver. The constraints of the bilevel stochastic MILP model include constraints on the second-stage upper-level and lower-level models in the BAM. Therefore, the proposed bilevel model includes a BNLP model and a bilevel stochastic MILP model. 
Subject to:(6)- (13), (23)-(26).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. CASE STUDY
In this section, numerical studies are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed two-stage nested bilevel model. Here, the scheduling horizon is considered one day with 24 equal time slots. The modified 8-bus test electrical power system is shown in Figure 5 , which includes five Gencos and a WPP with maximum capacity of 80MW. There is a LA in the B3-bus. The demand profiles of the LA are shown in Fig. 6 and include inelastic load and IBDR. The technical characteristics of Gencos and the responsive reward of the IBDR are shown in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. The production profile of the WPP is shown in Figure 7 reduction algorithms based on the K-means classification method described in [34] can be applied in this model. The LA charges customers a fixed electricity price of $70/MWh. We set the demand of the DARM to 10% of the load demand. In this paper, in order to assess the effect of LA participants on the decision making problem of multiple markets, two case studies are considered. In Case 1, without the participation of the LA, the scheduling strategies of the ISO are determined and the prices of multiple markets are determined. In Case 2, the LA and Gencos jointly participate in the DAEM, DARM and BAM this model incorporates the DEP and the price of the DARM, and calculating the response quantity of IBDR. We solve the bilevel model using the CPLEX solver in MATLAB on a 2.60 GHz Intel Core i7-7500 U CPU personal computer with 16 GB of RAM.
B. RESULTS ANALYSIS
The simulation results and clearing market of Cases 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 8 and 9. The energy and reserve balance of Case 1 in DAM are shown in Fig. 8. (a) and (b) , respectively. The clearing prices of the DAEM and DARM are shown in Fig. 8. (c) . The load demand in hours 1-3 is met by Genco 1 and the WPP, as Genco 1 has the lowest offered price. Therefore, the DEP in these hours are the same as the offer price of Genco 1. In hours 4-7 and 24, due to increased load demand, Genco 2 is added to meet the load demand. Therefore, the DEP is the same as the offer price of Genco 2 at these hours. In hours 8-13 and 23, Genco 1, 2, and 3 participate in the energy balance of the DAEM, and the DEP is $50/MWh, which is the same as the offer price of Genco 3. In hours 13-22, Genco 4 and 5 are sequentially added to meet the load demand. Therefore, the DEP in these hours is higher than that in other hours. Due to the interaction of energy and the reserve markets, the upward reserve prices of the DARM in hours 1-2 are equal to the upward reserve offer price of Genco 1. In hours 3-7, the upward reserve prices of the DARM are the same as the upward reserve offer price of Genco 2. Note that in hour 3, the sum of the upward reserve committed by Genco 1 in the DARM and the energy provided in the DAEM by Genco 1 reached its maximum power supply. Thus, the demand for upward reserves is met by Genco 1 and 2. Similarly, in other hours, the upward/downward prices of the DARM are equal to the highest offer reserve price of Gencos, when it participates in the DARM. The reason the reserve demand is provided by multiple Gencos is that the Genco with the lowest offer reserve price reaches maximum power supply, and more Gencos need to be shared. The energy and reserve balance of the DAEM and DARM for Case 2 are shown in Fig. 9 (a) and (b) , respectively. The clearing prices of the DAEM and DARM for Case 2 are shown in Fig. 9 (c) . The LA acts as an intermediate agent, bidding in the DAEM. In hours 1-13 and 23-24, the LA increases the energy purchased from the DAEM. In fact, in these hours, the LA tries to make the Gencos participate in the DAEM; the maximum power supply is reached because the LA purchases energy. In hours 14-22, the LA reduces the energy purchase requirements. Therefore, Genco 4 did not provide energy in hours 14-15 and 20-22, and Genco 5 did not provide energy in hours [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Thus, the DEP in these hours is lower than that for Case 1. However, in hours 14-15, 17-19 and 21-22, the DEPs are the same as in Case 1. The reason is that during these hours, the Gencos providing energy in the DAEM have reached their maximum power supply, and the DEPs at these hours are equal to the lowest offer price of the Gencos, which does provide energy in the DAEM [35] .
The optimization scheduling results for the BAM in Cases 1 and 2 are shown in Fig. 8 (d) and Fig. 9 (d) , respectively. In Case 1, the deviation due to WPP output uncertainty is balanced by scheduling Gencos in the BAM. However, in Case 2, the IBDR of the LA and reserve capacity VOLUME 7, 2019 of Gencos are scheduled together to eliminate the output error of the WPP. In hours 4 and 9-11 of Case 2, the LR and upward-LS are responsive, respectively. Therefore, during the upward-regulation periods in Case 2, the Gencos' scheduling decisions are changed compared to those in Case 1 to meet the demand of upward-LS and LR. In hours 7-8 and 16-21 of Case 2, LC are executed while the downward scheduling decisions of Gencos are also increased. It can be seen from a comparison of Cases 1 and 2 that the response quantity of the LC and downward-LS are higher than those of the LR and upward-LS. This occurs because reducing the load demand of the LA in the BAM not only makes the IBDR gain income but also reduces the cost of the Gencos due to the reduction in output because the goal is to maximize social welfare.
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, a sensitivity analysis with three parameters include that the ratio of the DARM demand to the load demand, the unit prices paid by the customers to the LA and the numbers of the WPP reduction scenarios. The profit of the LA is described in Table 3 . First, the effect of the ratio of the DARM demand to the load demand on the profit of the LA and the ISO is evaluated. For this purpose, when the value of the ratio of the DARM demand to the load demand is 0.08, the total profit of the LA is maximized. It is observed that before the ratio is 0.08, as the ratio increase, the profit of LA increases. Since, by increasing demand of DARM, the reserve committed capacity by Gencos augments in the BAM. It will facilitate the execution of IBDR. Moreover, Fig. 9 (d) indicates that the LC of IBDR have the highest execution ratio. In the BAM, customers earn a portion of the revenue through demand response while enjoying a reduction in the cost of electricity due to the LC. Therefore, as the ratio increases, the fees returned from the LA to the customers increase in the BAM. For this reason, with increasing the ratios, the profit of LA augments. The LA's profit from the DAEM is unchanged when the value of the ratio is 0 to 0.1. However, after the ratio is 0.08, as the ratio increases, the profit of LA decreases. Since, by increasing demand of DARM, the reserve committed by Gencos squeezes the profitable space of IBDR in BAM. The value of the ratio is 0.12, and the LA's profit obtained from the DAEM is reduced. The reason is that the increased demand of DARM has make Gencos to provide more energy to meet the demand of DAEM and DARM, which has led to increase of DEP. Thus, the LA's profit margin decreases in the DAEM. The virtual income of ISO is described in Table 4 . It is observed that with increasing the ratio of the DARM demand to the load demand, the profit of the ISO decreases. This occurs for the following several reasons: the first reason is that increasing the DRAM demand will cause the ISO to pay more fees for the Gencos to meet the DARM demand. The second reason is that the increased downward-regulation by the Gencos can match more LC and downward-LS, thereby reducing the Gencos' output in the BAM. Therefore, ISO refunded a portion of its revenue to Gencos and increased its rewards for IBDR of LA. The third reason is that ISO reduces the investment the penalty of wind power spill. When the ratio is 0.1, the penalty for the WPP's spilled output is 0, indicating that the DARM demand can reach the BAM demand and create an energy balance. Therefore, since the ratio is 0.1 and 0.12, the reward paid by the LA to the customers, the fees paid by the customers to the LA in the BAM, the profit of the LA obtained from the BAM, the reward of the IBDR paid by the ISO to the LA in the BAM and the income paid by the LA to the ISO in BAM are all equal. The sensitivity of the profit of the LA in the BAM, DAEM and wholesale energy market to unit price increases are shown in Fig. 10 . As shown, when the value of the unit price paid by the customer to the LA increases, the profit of the LA obtained from the BAM decreases and the profit of the LA obtained from the DAEM increases. This occurs because the unit price charged by the LA to the customers increases and the purchase energy expenditures of the LA incurred from the DAEM remain unchanged, causing the LA's revenue to increase in the DAEM. On the other hand, when the unit price increases, the profit margin of load reduction decreases for the LA. Although the profit of load recovery increases for the LA, the response quantity of load reduction is much higher than that of load recovery. Therefore, the profit of the LA decreases in the BAM. As the unit price is 61($/MWh), and the LA is not profitable in wholesale energy market and retailer electricity market. As the unit price increases, the expected total profit of the LA increases. We evaluate the sensitivity of the proposed model to the number of scenarios. The uncertain set of WPPs is reduced for different numbers of representative scenarios, corresponding to the probability of occurrence. In this way, we derive the LA's profit achieved in the proposed model for different scenarios, as shown in Fig. 11 . Note that such profit becomes stable in a case where the number of scenarios is 11. Increasing the number of scenarios does not significantly change the profitability of the LA, which means that the number of scenarios is already representative enough.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the bidding and trading strategies of a LA in DAEM and BAM are modeled. For this purpose, two-stage nested bilevel model is formulated, in which the upper-level and lower-level decision makers are the LA and the ISO, respectively. In the upper-level model, the objective of the LA is to maximize its expected profit. In the lower-level model, the ISO maximizes market social welfare through dispatch decisions. The first-stage of bilevel model is the BNLP, considering the LA as a price-maker. KKT conditions and dual theory are used to transform the BNLP into single-level linear programming. The second stage of bilevel model is bilevel mixed-integer linear stochastic programming, considering the LA as a price-taker. The uncertainty of the WPP in the BAM is reflected through a set of scenarios. The DR of the LA's bidding strategy is incorporated into the DAEM, and the IBDR of the LA's trading strategy is analyzed in the BAM. The main conclusions extracted from this paper are summarized as follows: (1) The profit of LA operating in multiple markets is higher than when it operates in a single market. (2) When LA participates in the bidding and pricing of the DAEM as a price-maker, it not only effectively reduces the DEP of the DAEM but also maximizes the social welfare of the wholesale energy market. (3) In the BAM, the contact execution of the LC and downward-LS is higher than that of the LR and upward-LS. 
